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This article reconsiders the forms and functions of colonial police actions
in the repression of organized dissent. In part, it is a study of changing pat-
terns of repressive behaviour in worsening economic conditions, an approach
which explains the concentration on the inter-war period, cleaved as it was
by the acute economic disruptions of the Depression years. In part, it is an
investigation of the connections between perception and action. Focusing on
Colonial Office instructions regarding protest policing, it examines the ways
in which police and military security forces in the British Empire constructed
enemies of colonial state ‘order’. This, it is argued, shaped the resultant stra-
tegies of repressive restriction, riot control, and labour containment adopted.
Cet article réexamine les formes et les fonctions de l’intervention des
polices coloniales dans la répression de l’opposition organisée. C’est, d’une
part, une analyse de l’évolution de la répression sous l’effet de la dégrada-
tion des conditions économiques. Ceci explique la focalisation sur la période
de l’entre-deux-guerres, marquée par les bouleversements intenses des
années de la Dépression. C’est d’autre part une étude des relations entre la
perception et l’action. En se concentrant sur les instructions du Colonial
Office concernant le maintien de l’ordre, l’article examine de quelle manière
la police et l’armée se représentaient les ennemis de l’«ordre» étatique colo-
nial dans l’Empire britannique; son argument est que ces représentations
informaient les stratégies répressives de contrôle, de maintien de l’ordre et
d’encadrement du monde du travail.
Inside the Colonial Office, its colonnaded facade soaked by London’s murkydrizzle on Armistice Day, 11 November 1918, Secretary of State for the
Colonies Walter Long put his signature to a letter circulated to the governors and
high commissioners in the generally warmer climes of the British Empire. Long’s
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despatch was about civil disorder, and how colonial police forces might cope with it.
It addressed the worst-case scenarios of colonial policing that were, it seemed,
becoming alarmingly commonplace2. The Minister’s principal concern was not that
colonial administrations would respond with too much violence but, rather, that they
would dither, and apply too little, too late :
It is, I am sure, unnecessary that I should urge caution in having recourse to
the use of military force for the maintenance of civil order or urge forbearance in
dealing with riotous crowds by those in command of the forces so employed. The
natural reluctance of responsible persons to employ weapons of precision against
civilians may be relied upon to delay the adoption of military methods of repression
until the need is urgent. I believe it is rather in the opposite direction that a Gover-
nor may be inclined on occasion to err. I therefore think it desirable to remind you
that hesitation in invoking military aid when the need for it is apparent, or in making
due use of it when obtained, may in the end lead to greater loss of life than would
otherwise have occurred3.
Why was the Minister so concerned? As the guns fell silent in Europe, the scope
for arbitrary arrest, collective fines, detention without trial, or state-sanctioned vio-
lence against even small gatherings of people in Europe’s empires was very wide
indeed. For its Colonial and War Office draughtsmen, however, two pre-requisites –
deterrence and economy - underpinned the architecture of repressive legal powers that
emerged over the winter of 1918-1919. The two certainties facing colonial govern-
ments confronted with disorder were that there would be neither enough locally avail-
able police or troops to go round, nor the money to pay for more4. In the British Empire
especially, suppression of civil protest reflected a prevailing ‘make do’ administrative
culture steeped in a Victorian ethos of self-reliant, self-financing colonial government,
and reinforced by the swingeing expenditure cuts of the immediate post-war years5.
Set against this prevailing concern for economy, two other points bears emphasis.
First was the broad agreement among security force officers about the merits of coer-
cion as pre-emption, a variant of the minimum force ideal. Few questioned the calcu-
lation that coercive capacity, rapidly deployed, sustained colonial authority cheaply
and efficiently. Policemen, soldiers and, increasingly, military aircraft were inevitably
the key instruments in this strategy6. This ‘repressive consensus’ rarely broke down in
the British Empire between the wars. Spectacular instances of such breakdown – as,
for example, over the Amritsar massacre in 1919 or quarrels over the recruitment of
Jewish police auxiliaries during the Arab rebellion in Palestine after 1936 – were
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exceptions rather than the rule. The second point is that the expansion of colonial
police powers should not be mistaken for a consolidation of imperial rule. Protracted
rebellions may have remained rare, but numerous colonies in the early twentieth cen-
tury remained tense societies in which European hegemony was strongly contested.
Put simply, repressive policing was usually born of weakness, not strength, and greater
use of violence pointed to a crisis of authority rather than its ultimate incontestability.
A NEW REPRESSIVE CONSENSUS
AFTER WORLD WAR I?
During the war just ending, Britain’s empire, like its French counterpart, had
been convulsed by numerous rural uprisings, urban riots, workplace protests, and
other forms of civil disobedience. Often, these culminated in violent clashes with
police and troops, what, in Charles Tilly’s terms, would be described as ‘contentious
action’7. Among French colonies badly affected, Algeria and much of French West
Africa stood out. Reactions there were sharpest to the coercive recruitment drives of
1915 to 1917. At the height of the disturbances in West Africa from December 1915
to July 1916 French soldiers and police destroyed over 200 villages along the Niger
River valley in punishment for dissent8. With the obvious exception of Ireland’s
Easter rising, the worst disorder in the British Empire occurred on the island of
 Ceylon. During May and June 1915 the colonial government in Colombo was forced
to declare martial law having lost political control in several provinces during a
spate of inter-communal violence that originated in processional clashes during
Buddhist religious festivals between the Sinhalese majority and recent Indian
 Muslim immigrant traders, known as coastal Moors9. Additional troops were called
out in the central highlands and in the island’s south-western quadrant. Loyalist
irregulars were also recruited to help put down widespread unrest, the socio-eco-
nomic, religious, and communal origins of which the authorities found impossible
to disentangle10. Viewed paradoxically both at the time and by historians as a spon-
taneous anti-Muslim pogrom and a sign of emergent anti-colonial sentiment, more
recent interpretations point to the prominent role played in the disturbances by Sin-
halese-Buddhist nationalists, who harnessed the backing of sympathetic local agita-
tors to orchestrate the violence11. Whatever the case, the bald statistics made grim
reading. At least forty Moors were killed and the numbers arrested ran close to
9,00012. The clampdown’s severity and its lack of selectivity compounded the
humiliation felt by British administrators in Ceylon, India, and Whitehall13.
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The subsequent Colonial Office inquiry recognized this as a case where the use
of troops ‘in aid of the civil power’ had gone badly wrong. Reference was made to
the so-called Featherstone ‘massacre’ of September 1893 in which two striking
 miners in the West Yorkshire town of Featherstone were shot dead after the army
was called in to assist the policing of a protracted pithead lock-out14. The Feather-
stone shootings made British governments more reluctant to deploy troops along-
side policemen to police industrial disputes and major public disturbances even
 during the huge resurgence of industrial unrest in Britain between 1909 and 191215.
In this, they were only partially successful. Not only was the army called in to help
contain protracted disorders in the Rhondda Valley coalfield in November 1910, but
legal authority over the use of police and troops in and around Tonypandy passed
inexorably from the police chief constable to the military commander16. Neither was
able to prevent protests over pithead lock-outs escalating into riotous confrontations
between striking miners, police and troops. Official indecision, and recrimination
between the authorities involved, added to the sense of breakdown, although no one
was killed17. Fatalities were also avoided during the mineworkers’ and dockyard
strikes in South Wales and London during 1911. But soldiers called in to escort
police vans carrying rioters arrested during Liverpool’s bitter transport strike shot
men dead during the largest mass demonstration in the city on 13 August 191118.
As Barbara Weinberger notes, in the wake of this ‘great unrest’ the British
govern ment was compelled to adopt much clearer standards and legal regulations
regarding the containment of violent civil protest19. The question confronting Colo-
nial Office officials a few years later was whether the Ceylon riots should do the same
in the British Empire. The answer was yes. Sandwiched between increasingly violent
worker protest in British India before the war and the reappearance of urban food
riots immediately after it, the Ceylon disturbances left a lasting administrative legacy
in changes made at Walter Long’s behest to the policing of colonial demonstrations20.
It fell to the Government of India and the India Office in London to resolve the
dilemmas of internal security in the British Raj. But Ceylon was a Colonial Office
responsibility. Taking its cue from British India’s longer and more varied experience
of mass protest, the Colonial Office was, in some degree, simply ‘catching up’ with
the imperial bureaucracy of the Raj21.The 1915 Defence of India Act, justified at the
time as a wartime expedient, arrogated emergency powers to imperial security
forces, including its armed policemen. Sweeping legislative powers to suppress
Indian political violence, especially prevalent in Bengal and the Punjab, would be
further entrenched by the Anarchical and Military Crimes Act of 1919. This legisla-
tion was itself the product of a judicial review of extended peacetime emergency
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powers conducted on behalf of the Government of India by a committee headed by
British judge, S. A. T. Rowlatt22. If India spurred some empire-wide changes, others
were prompted by the frictions in government arising from the breakdown of British
rule in Ireland, whose political violence reverberated throughout metropolitan
 society23.
Charles Townshend brings out the fundamental clash of civil-military cultures
between politicians and generals in Britain and the empire by focusing on the argu-
ments and anomalies of martial law legislation as imposed in Ireland following the
Easter Rising of April 191624. Where army officers had always favoured clarity
regarding their right to use force during a civil emergency, the coalition government
preferred ambiguity25. Both positions were understandable. Soldiers feared courts
martial or worse if they were found to have transgressed the perilously imprecise line
between legitimate use of lethal force against sedition and the murder of civilians.
Decisions to fire on violent crowds, strikers or gunmen might well be pardoned by a
retrospective Act of Indemnity but, then again, they might not. Army commanders
faced cross-examination, damage to reputation, or even dismissal and imprisonment
if suspected of having used excessive violence. For their part, Westminster politicians
across the political spectrum valued the threat implicit in martial law over its actual
application. Enacting martial law signified the failure of politics. To impose it was to
acknowledge the incapacity of the state, the police, and the judiciary to function as
before26. Speaking in relation to Ireland, Townshend puts it thus, ‘Insofar as it had a
positive intention, the government wished to keep the army in its traditional, low-pro-
file role of supplying aid to the civil power. British political leaders were naturally
concerned to maintain the impression that the disruption resulting from the republi-
can campaign had not exhausted the normal resources of the civil administration’27.
It was a forlorn hope. Governmental determination to conserve the appearance
of normality became untenable as Ireland’s political violence intensified28. To make
matters worse, senior politicians, army officers and trained civil servants were soon
wrestling with the more basic problem of how to police Ireland in the short term
while preparing for partition and withdrawal29. In these fast-moving and increas-
ingly chaotic circumstances, rare were the officials who fully grasped the theoreti-
cal and practical differences between the key legislative instruments designed to
prevent sedition or violent protest. Few, for instance, were crystal clear about the
lines separating martial law as applied in war-torn Ireland from the Defence of the
Realm Act passed on the outbreak of war in August 1914. Most continued to make
reference to another precedent entirely – the procedures of the long-established Riot
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Act with its more limited recourse to troop call-outs in time of civil or industrial
strife30. Only in January 1934 did the Army Council issue regular army officers
 stationed in imperial territory with a digestible fifty-page booklet containing defin-
itive guidance on the distinctions between their responsibilities to assist police in
‘normal circumstance’, under martial law and ‘in aid to the civil power’31. In the
same year, the Colonial Office commissioned a similar, pocket-sized instruction
book, ‘The Powers, Training and Handling of Civil Police in Times of Internal Dis-
order’, designed to be carried by colonial police officers on duty. But when the
booklet was finally completed two years later in July 1936, it lived up to its cum-
bersome title and was immediately rejected on the grounds that it was too big, too
complicated, and substantially irrelevant32. A specially-appointed inter-departmen-
tal committee was sent back to the drawing board in an effort to translate complex
legal procedure into simple, sequential instructions in case of public disorder33.
As if these abstract considerations were not taxing enough, immediately after the
First World War anxiety in Whitehall about the behaviour of the large numbers of
ex-servicemen recruited to colonial police forces was intensified by the prominent
part played by former soldiers in race riots, rowdy demonstrations, and street vio-
lence in mainland Britain in the first two years after the Armistice34. The brutality of
British paramilitary auxiliaries in Ireland offered further proof of the political dam-
age that could be done locally and internationally by such groups35.At the opposing
end of the political spectrum, thousands of demobilized service personnel joined the
fast expanding ranks of Britain’s trade unions, whose membership peaked at
8,348,000 in 1920, double the 1914 figure. The potential for political violence and
industrial strife in the new decade ahead to eclipse their pre-war antecedents in
scale, breadth and revolutionary potential was impossible to ignore36.
It did not seem far-fetched to suggest that a brutalized generation of young men
inured to lethal violence and alienated from civilian life by their dreadful war expe-
riences might destabilize imperial Britain37. For some commentators, it was only a
matter of time38. In these circumstances, sharp divergences between the views of
soldiers, politicians, and bureaucrats were readily comprehensible. But the gulf
between them caused lasting confusion and, in the short term, helped account for the
erosion of civil liberties during the Anglo-Irish War of 1919-2139.
As Townshend concludes:
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What became clear in the end was that a modern liberal-democratic state required
an emergency mechanism more sophisticated than martial law to cope with
domestic crises. A workable system required formal codification of emergency
powers; to go from the ordinary law to the arbitrary “will of the general,” shiel-
ded retrospectively by an Act of Indemnity, was a move too jarring to be feasible.
In practice, a civil-military power struggle developed, reducing the soldiers to
bafflement and anger and preventing the pursuit of any coherent “governing”
policy…To the last, the civil authorities showed no sign of being able to find a
modus operandi or modus vivendi with the military40.
EXEMPLARY FORCE AND DANGEROUS PRECEDENTS
The Indian and Irish experiences clearly impressed Britain’s imperial rulers with
the need for sharper legislative instruments and muscular police powers to uphold
colonial control in the more volatile circumstances of the immediate post-war
period41. But the conviction that prompt, decisive intervention was necessary to
crush rebellion was neither new, nor especially British. In Australia, for example,
outspoken support for Sinn Fein among a highly vocal minority, when combined
with official fears of Bolshevik-style worker dissent, were enough to provoke fun-
damental changes in police and security service organization between 1917 and
191942. And use of targeted, exemplary force against crowds to demonstrate the
physical power and moral authority of the state was supposedly axiomatic to French
policing of industrial protest43. Long after the use of selective lethal violence
became a rarity in British public order policing, the administrators, police and mili-
tary officers responsible for the British Empire’s security remained attached to this
notion of exemplary force44. But what was it? What, indeed, was a crowd, and how
did one know when such a gathering assumed dangerous proportions?
These were questions to which Walter Long wanted answers – and answers of
the empirical, pragmatic sort preferred within Whitehall over the abstract thoughts
of crowd theorists like Gustave Le Bon45. Yet one should not take the image of
doughty British pragmatism, informed by precedent rather than theoretical insight,
too far. The associations made by Le Bon and others, such as Scipio Sighele, Henry
Fournial, and Gabriel Tarde, between criminality and crowd behaviour, between
collective  psychology and urban disorder, would influence lawmakers and law-
enforcers for decades to come46. Refracting the work of these crowd theorists, Louis
Lépine,  Prefect of Police in turn-of-the-century Paris, paid especially close attention
to  collective assembly – whether spontaneous or pre-planned – as the foremost
internal threat to state security and law-abiding bourgeois society. Lépine returned
to this theme in his memoirs, published on the eve of the Great Depression in 1929.
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Again reflecting the crowd theory first popularized in the feverish political atmos-
phere of the 1890s, he dwelt on the terrifying spectre of the enraged proletarian mass
hell-bent on social revolution47.
It is impossible to say how many colonial police officers, French or British, had
heard of Scipio Sighele or Gabriel Tarde, still less how many had read their work. But
it seems a reasonable supposition that most politicians with security responsibilities
in Paris and London had some acquaintance with Gustave Le Bon’s ideas, as well as
more than a passing interest in Louis Lépine. Even those who had never encountered
their writings directly were bound to do so indirectly when reading the police manu-
als and individual colonial government instructions that dealt with police responses
to public protest and crowd violence. British experts in colonial policing may never
have read up on crowd theory in the manner that, almost forty year later, French psy-
chological warfare officers in the Algerian War consumed Sergeı̌ Chakhotine’s ideas
on mass persuasion and propaganda48. What is certain is that British officials between
the wars were increasingly preoccupied by violent industrial protest and by the poten-
tial for sudden explosions of crowd violence at home and in the empire49.
Thus we return to Walter Long. Using the dry, bureaucratic phraseology of his
senior legal adviser, the Colonial Secretary explained the problem:
Experience in many parts of the Empire has proved that it is difficult, if not impos-
sible, for the responsible authorities at a time of crisis to draw up, on the spur of the
moment, instructions to those engaged in repressing disorder which shall be precise,
adequate, and clear enough to guide persons without legal training and perhaps
without practice in the exercise of public authority. The questions involved are dif-
ficult, and there is no time to study them, or to consider and provide against all the
possibilities of misunderstanding inherent in conveying legal principles to those
who must necessarily, in the majority of cases, be unprepared by previous training
to grasp them. Uncertainty as to their powers and duties may lead such persons
either to take refuge in inaction or, from excess of zeal, to adopt measures which
cannot be justified. Either course may have deplorable results50.
Simply put, neither colonial governments nor their policemen knew what to do
when confronted with mass protest. Some reacted too slowly, others too quickly;
some with insufficient shows of strength, others with excessive brutality. But what
was ‘proportionate’ state violence and when should it be used? Here again, answers
turned on what constituted a crowd or, more exactly, a threatening one. It was this
that Long wanted his subordinate governors to clarify.
The Minister’s invitation to individual colonial governments to explain precisely
the circumstances in which police or military units were authorized to fire on groups
of unarmed protesters masked the fact that Colonial Office officials, along with
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 colleagues from the War Office, had already drawn up revised guidelines on the use
of lethal force against demonstrators as part of the official inquiry into the Ceylon
disorders51. These were now to be rolled out across the Empire, ostensibly as part of
a consultation process, a stock-taking of colonial policing in the immediate post-war
months. The exercise was certainly timely. Many of the Empire’s key political
spaces were especially unruly: Ireland, India, Egypt, and Iraq, to name only the
most obvious examples manifested everything across the spectrum of internal dis-
order from outright civil war to army massacre, urban revolution, and ethno-reli-
gious uprising52. In other places, police struggled to cope with outbursts of inter-
communal violence. Blood-letting between Arabs and Jews began with two days of
rioting in Jerusalem’s old city in April 1920 before Britain’s mandate over Palestine
was even confirmed53. More protracted clashes in Jaffa and Ramleh in early May
1921 left forty-eight Arabs and forty-seven Jews dead54. Perhaps most shocking of
all, South Africa would see state suppression of industrial unrest transformed into
government-endorsed race killing by settler vigilantes during the Rand miners’
strikes of 192255.
But, in November 1918, and for the next twenty years, the Colonial Office’s
principal concern in matters of empire policing was with more a mundane, but
nonetheless vital issue: how to maintain the apparatus of colonial authority without
calling upon military power to uphold it. As this problem implied, the answer hinged
on colonial police forces, their training and composition, their deployment and their
actions. Behind this challenge lurked deeper questions of state legitimacy, or the
‘right to rule’ of imperial nations that would soon be tested in new ways by the
League of Nations and its mandate system. If, as the European imperial powers
insisted, their colonial authority conferred the right to monopolize the use of vio-
lence to guarantee internal order, then the forms and scale of such violence required
tighter regulation in an era when both internal threats to Empire and international
scrutiny of imperial responses to such threats seemed bound to increase56. Colonial
authorities had to act consistently if, as was possible, those that demonstrated
against them might be killed in the name of good government.
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Viewed in a certain light, writing new rules for the containment of political vio-
lence (actual or potential) by the use of lethal fire power (itself, state-sanctioned
political violence) was even a progressive step. So was engaging on-the-spot offi-
cials, if not colonial peoples, in the process. The Colonial Office certainly thought
so. Regulations about police riot control, about troop call-outs ‘in aid of the civil’
authorities, and about the circumstances in which martial law could be declared had
been similarly codified in Britain over the course of the nineteenth century57. It was
time the colonies followed suit. Moreover, the replies received to Walter Long’s cir-
cular highlighted alarming disparities in practice between individual territories.
Several colonial governments made reference to dubious past precedents – the Duke
of Wellington’s reflections on sabre charges by mounted troops in Britain’s indus-
trial cities or the bloody suppression of Jamaica’s Morant Bay rebellion in 1865 for
instance – to justify the harshest crowd control measures58. And Long himself con-
sulted the 1866 inquiry report into the Morant Bay uprising, which lambasted the
government in Kingston for having ‘thrown away the advantage of the terror which
the very name of martial law is calculated to create in a population such as that
which exists in this Island’59.
Talk of terror, of cutting down protesters with bullets and bayonets, jarred with
the emergent post-war mantra of ‘minimum force’ policing. Ever since a 1907 offi-
cial inquiry into the use of buckshot to break up prison riots in Trinidad, the Gover-
nors of the West Indies remained divided over the permissible extent of police ‘free
firing’ without prior authorization60.Where volleys were clearly ordered by superior
officers and carefully targeted at identified ‘ringleaders’ the use of lethal firearms
was commended. Such was the case, for example, during rioting in Jamaica’s port of
Montego Bay on 5 April 1902 in which the city Court House came under attack.
Inspector H.T. Thomas, the police officer in charge, deployed a party of constables
who fired twenty-five shots at the protest leaders. He was later praised for his deci-
sive action in the official inquiry into the day’s events61. Elsewhere, the Governors
conceded, more random police shootings remained a recurrent feature of civil dis-
order in the British-ruled Caribbean, something they ascribed to the natural
excitability of ‘Negro policemen’ and the excessive generosity of white officers in
supplying their subordinates with ammunition62. The crass dismissal of random
killing as a form of local exuberance, albeit dating from ten years earlier, showed
that Long’s vision of orderly protest policing would necessitate profound change in
the psychology of certain colonial officials and in the policing practiced in parts of
the empire’s city streets, prison yards and cane-fields.
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None of this should surprise. In the absence of basic freedoms of association or
of assembly, let alone of democratic representation, Africans, Asians and West Indi-
ans living under the British flag were liable to be treated as seditious whenever they
gathered in even small groups (smaller than a football team or a wedding party, for
example). They were considered threatening if they reacted too slowly to official
instructions to disperse. If they ignored those instructions entirely, the consequences
might be commensurately worse. Take, for instance, the so-called ‘Hosein riots’ of
1884, the worst single incident of police violence against Indian indentured labour-
ers in British-ruled Trinidad before the First World War. In this case, the labourers’
fateful decision to defy an official ban on public processions led to clashes with
police during the Shiite religious festival of Muhurrum, or Hosein. The outcome
was the killing of twenty-two labourers and the wounding of hundreds more63.
Trinidad’s Hosein riots remind us of another factor : the role of employers. Their
claims that the actions of ‘rioters’, strikers or, as in this case, festival celebrants,
were prejudicial to productivity or a menace to crops, livestock or commercial prop-
erty, could increase the likelihood of harsher protest policing. Local authorities often
responded by instructing police to treat such demonstrations as the equivalent of
political disorder, particularly if those employers happened to be European. For
instance, the Indian Tea Association, which lobbied on behalf of British planters,
worked in conjunction with police representatives in the Assam and Bengal Leg-
islative Assemblies to ensure a common approach to any labour unrest on their gar-
den estates64. French rubber producers in Indochina, Dutch planters in Sumatra, and
Belgian timber producers in the Congo worked in similar fashion, although not
always with success.
Not surprisingly, British India, in the early twentieth century still the largest
colonial agglomeration of them all, shone particularly harsh light on the hollowness
of minimum force policing. As Prashant Kidambi notes in his study of the policing
of Bombay before the First World War, studies of the colonial police in British India
have stressed its relative weakness as an instrument of social control, highlighting
funding shortages, limited social reach, and de facto reliance on both local elites and
compliant auxiliaries to make feasible any regular policing of the rural poor and the
emerging urban working class65. Ranajit Guha’s 1998 study of the colonial state in
India, for instance, suggests that British reliance on coercive force to subjugate a
population denied political opportunity to express its demands necessarily under-
mined Britain’s claims to hegemonic control. Ruling through coercion and not con-
sent paradoxically set narrow limits to Britain’s capacity to embed colonial rule
among India’s population66. Drawing on Guha’s finding, Purnima Bose takes this
absence of hegemonic control one step further. In her analysis of British parliamen-
tary censure of General Reginald Dyer for ordering Gurkha and Baluchi troops to
gun down hundreds of civilian protesters at Amritsar on 13 April 1919, Bose argues
that the very absence of hegemonic security force control produced the inclination
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among ‘rogue’ officers to extreme acts of exemplary state violence of which the
Amritsar massacre was only the most egregious inter-war example67. Framed differ-
ently, heightened colonial coercion derived from the absence of real authority, not
from the capacity of a powerful state to act without restraint68. General Dyer
regarded his mission in Amritsar not as the restoration of civil authority but as a
wartime operation against a hostile population. For Dyer, ‘Amritsar was enemy ter-
ritory’69. After the massacre his supporters maintained that Dyer’s actions had liter-
ally turned back a rising tide of aggressive Indian humanity. The image of a near
unstoppable torrent of undifferentiated, innately violent colonial subjects only dis-
suaded from rebellion by exemplary punishment – by death or the fear of it –
recurred time and again in the turbulent years immediately after 191870.
Coercive policing, then, was a powerful indicator of the colonial state’s limited
reach. Kidambi rightly acknowledges that this interpretive trend towards equating
state violence with state weakness has enhanced our understanding of the colonial
police in India, not as a powerful monolith, but as a complex and dynamic social
organization whose local networks of influence, recruitment, and co-option enabled
it to function in increasingly testing circumstances. By extension, the absence or
collapse of these networks could lead to a rapid loss of control, often with appalling
consequences. Kidambi’s conclusion is damning: ‘if earlier studies of the colonial
police perceived it as emblematic of an omnipotent colonial state, the revisionist
view emphasises the ‘fragility of its control’. Yet, as he concedes, some of these
revisionist accounts go too far, overstating the weaknesses of the colonial police and
the extent to which it became ‘imprisoned’ within the confines of local networks of
power in particular urban contexts71.
Perhaps the most salient point to emerge in Kidambi’s study relates to the
 intimate working relationships between the major employers in Bombay’s textile
industry and local police commanders. Strikes and other workplace disputes over
pay and conditions in the textile sector, as well as police efforts to regulate the casual
‘economy of the street’ in which numerous poor economic migrants scratched out a
living, triggered more sustained working class protest in the city’s poorest quarters
than the better known outbreaks of plague and inter-communal clashes between
Hindu and Muslim. These last events occasioned greater collective violence and
notorious instances of lethal police intervention to curb urban rioting. But they were
not the stuff of everyday policing. Put differently, while historians have been drawn
to major outbreaks of urban disorder in Bombay that required most high-profile
police intervention, notably in 1893 and 1898, the more workaday activity of
 Bombay’s police centred on the workplace, whether it concerned the informal econ-
omy of street-trading or, more especially, the expanding numbers of rural labourers
that had migrated to work in the city’s textile mills. It was here that the circuits of
cooperation between police, employers, and local auxiliaries functioned most
clearly of all. Heightened police interventionism, typified by the greater police
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patrolling enshrined in the 1902 City Police Act, was meant to ensure public order
through closer surveillance of Bombay’s highly mobile, densely packed labour
force, whether at the factory gates or on the streets72.
POLICING PUBLIC SPACE:
‘PAYING THE BUTCHER’S BILL’
Returning to Walter Long’s 1919 inquiry, what did the Colonial Office recom-
mend police officers should do when confronted with dangerous protest? First, that,
once due warnings were given, it was preferable to make early, accurate use of lethal
force to disperse a crowd. Delaying the order to fire or shooting ineffectually either
over protesters heads or at their legs (as occurred in the 1915 Ceylon disturbances)
antagonized demonstrators without terrorizing them. This risked a greater loss of
life at a later stage. Second, that this shoot to kill instruction was to target ‘ringlead-
ers’ wherever feasible73. Finally, that shooting as execution (presumably, after cap-
ture), as opposed to shooting to prevent the escalation of unrest, remained illegal
and, therefore, impermissible74. Whatever the practical difficulties of discerning and
maintaining such distinctions, colonial administrators generally presumed that this
could be done. 
With the professionalization of colonial forces tied to more effective protest
policing, we should not be surprised at the apparent ease with which some colonial
forces served the needs of colonial employers between the wars. Colonies’ Legisla-
tive Councils usually contained a strong business and settler representation. And
workplaces, industrial or agricultural, were the commonest locations for collective
protests, whether spontaneous stoppages, longer-term strikes or other demonstra-
tions. As we saw in the case of Assam’s influential tea planters, some police forces
had worked hand-in-glove with their local business community for years. Interna-
tional settlements in colonial, or quasi-colonial, port cities were another discrete
location where the demands of commerce and policing intersected. As in the case of
British India, Colonial Office staff took an interest in the peculiarities of local polic-
ing even though, as an international settlement run by a municipal council, Shang-
hai did not fall under Colonial Office jurisdiction. From its inception in 1854 the
Shanghai Municipal Police Force (SMP) defended the privileges of the Treaty Port’s
British residents, upholding the barriers – political, commercial, racial, and social –
between British ‘Shanghailanders’ and their ‘foreign’ neighbours, whether Euro-
pean or Chinese. So vociferous and, on occasion, so violent was their policing of
these exclusions and the protests they provoked that, as Robert Bickers has shown,
the ramifications could be global75. The SMP’s suppression of riots in Shanghai on
POLICING BRITISH COLONIAL PROTEST AFTER 1918 67
72 Ibid. (2004, pp. 28-41).
73 Defending security force killings of Jamaicans after the Morant Bay uprising in October 1865, the
Island’s Governor stressed that ‘ringleaders’ were quickly identified and appropriately targeted, see:
Kostal (2005, pp. 24-28).
74 NA, CO 323/771/B, copy of Ceylon Orders for Troops’ and 1915 Martial Law declaration. For an
interesting, albeit more institutionally extreme, parallel in the punishment of ‘ringleaders’ of colo-
nial insurrection, in this case, the Herero of German South West Africa, see Hull (2005, pp. 17-19).
75 Bickers (1991, pp. 185-198).
13 May 1925, which left eleven Chinese dead, even marked a watershed in the
development of the Chinese nationalist movement76.
Yet, despite the scale of these adverse consequences, few lessons were learned.
Ambassador Sir Miles Lampson in Peking pressed for a reconsideration of policing
in Shanghai’s International Settlements but the city’s colonial police culture sur-
vived77. Indeed, the SMP’s continued treatment of anti-imperialist demonstrations,
not just as an illegal gathering, but as a form of urban crime would be replicated by
other British colonial police units deployed to contain civil unrest78. Take, for
instance, the most violent clashes of the 1920s between the Straits Settlements
police and Chinese demonstrators in Singapore. These occurred on 12 March 1927
during a march commemorating the second anniversary of the death of
 Kuomintang-founder and nationalist patriot, Sun Yat Sen. The previous year’s com-
memorations had passed off peacefully and so the police scaled back the number of
officers deployed twelve months later. Yet the authorities’ intolerance of open
 support for the Kuomintang (KMT) had hardened in between times. This was
largely because of the Chinese nationalist party’s adoption of a strident pro-leftist
position in the wake of the earlier Shanghai riots in May 1925 in which the munici-
pal police played so pivotal a role79. The tenor of relations between the Straits
 Settlements police and Singapore’s Chinese community also changed decisively
once news of the events in Shanghai became more widely known80. Police raids on
KMT offices, Chinese night schools and meeting houses increased in frequency, and
young  members of the Chinese Hailam community (with ties to Hainan Island,
China’s southern-most province) were targeted as a troublesome source of seditious,
anti-western propaganda81.
Singapore’s 1927 march turned ugly after marchers surrounded a police station
at South Bridge Road in Kreta Ayer. This was a predominantly Chinese district of
the city and was known for relatively high levels of Triad-related crime. Kreta
Ayer’s local constables, like those of the entire Straits Settlements force, comprised
a mixture of Malays, Sikhs, and Punjabi Pashtuns. As Singapore’s Attorney-General
noted with studied under-statement during the inquest into what followed, ‘unlike
the police at home, the local police are not the friends of the people, from the
 Chinese point of view’82. Architecture played almost as much of a role as ethnicity.
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The Kreta Ayer police building had multiple entrances, making it susceptible to
being ‘rushed’ by a hostile crowd. Fearing this eventuality, the station’s British
police commander, Chief Officer Dale, went outside in a bid to mollify those
 gathering outside. Moments later he was kicked to the ground and left with concus-
sion, leaving his men without instruction once they managed to drag him back
inside. Soon afterwards four Malay constables were also badly beaten. Shooting
began when protestors tried to storm the station83. The police fired twenty-nine
rounds, killing five Hailam demonstrators and two passers-by, one Indian, the other
Chinese84.
Was this a replay of the events in Shanghai two years earlier? Singapore’s senior
police officers and legal officials thought not. Their view was simple. Violence of
the sort witnessed at Kreta Ayer was a foreign import, uncharacteristic of the city’s
well-established and law-abiding Chinese commercial community. Those responsi-
ble were more recent immigrants, mainly casual labourers and Hailam students. The
Hailam especially were singled out as irredeemably alien; young hotheads who
brought the contagion of China’s anarchy and communist anti-colonialism with
them. Armed by the city’s criminal gangs, these revolutionary agitators, though
small in number and peripheral to ‘true’ Malayan politics, were a menace to colonial
security. Vulnerable and exposed, Kreta Ayer’s policemen were simply in the wrong
place at the wrong time85. Singapore’s newly-arrived Governor Sir Hugh Clifford
praised the besieged constables for their restraint, not least as their commander and
several colleagues already lay wounded before shots were fired86. There was less
certainty about the Singapore clashes back in London where Labour Party calls for
a full inquiry compelled the Colonial Office to conduct yet another review of police
crowd control measures. Unlike Sir Hugh, some dissentient voices did criticize the
police, not, though, for firing too much; rather, for not using volley fire immediately.
The shooting had clearly compelled the marchers to pull back from the station, so
the policemen’s only error was to fire ineffective initial warning shots87. The
 argument was bluntly summarized by one unnamed official thus: ‘firing in the air is
mistaken leniency. In the end it increases the “butcher’s bill”88.
NEW DECADE, SAME PRIORITIES?
PROTEST POLICING IN THE 1930S
As the scope of public order policing widened to include everything from
 suppression of dissent and workplace protest to tax collection and the enforcement
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of public health codes, the potential for collective antagonism to police intervention
grew accordingly.
Results were sometimes spectacular. In October 1931 police in Nicosia were
overwhelmed by Cypriot protesters demanding union with Greece. Once the police
lines were broken, the crowd vented its anger against British rule by burning down
the Governor’s residence89. Rioting continued in Cypriot towns for several more
days until troops flown in from Egypt, their heavy equipment brought by sea,
restored order. Security force difficulties were compounded by Cypriot outrage at
the arrest of five ‘ringleaders’, including two former members of the Island’s Leg-
islative Council and the Greek Orthodox Bishop of Kitium90. Targeting ringleaders
was entirely consistent with evolving police practice, but there were red faces in the
Colonial Office when the five were deported for inciting violence under the terms of
a ‘Defence Order in Council’ hastily invoked by Governor Sir Ronald Storrs. This
was of a piece with other arbitrary actions by the now homeless Governor, including
his decision to abolish the island’s troublesome Legislative Council, some of whose
Greek members persisted in making the case for Enosis91. Police inability to contain
a riot had turned into a full-blown political emergency.
The rapid escalation of the Cyprus crisis after the police first lost control had
repercussions for British colonial policing far beyond the Eastern Mediterranean.
The Nicosia disorders in October 1931 made plain that colonial governments needed
better legislative instruments to hand to assist their police commanders. Simple
things mattered. It it was vital that police have authority to requisition vehicles to help
them deploy more quickly. Officers also needed to know that a blanket ban on public
protest could be imposed without delay92. The resultant ‘Peace and Good Order Bill’
promulgated in Cyprus might have become a model for colonies elsewhere had its
provisions not been superseded by the more Draconian legislation introduced at
much the same time in Palestine to contend with the developing Arab revolt93.
Meanwhile, on 7 February 1936, the very day that the Cyprus legislation pro-
posals reached the Colonial Office, an assistant district officer (ADI) and an Indian
police inspector died in confrontations with Manga Arabs in the Malindi quarter of
Zanzibar. Trouble started at the offices of the city’s agricultural department where a
small group of merchants accused food inspectors of discrimination in their random
checks for sub-standard copra, a staple crop traded by Zanzibar’s Manga commu-
nity. The inspection regime had been introduced two years earlier. It was enforced
with police assistance, partly because it adversely affected those copra sellers, like
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the Manga, who relied on newly-purchased local produce to sell at market. Richer
plantation owners and copra shippers could afford to leave their produce to ripen in
commercial drying sheds and so escaped the inspectors’ gaze. To the Manga, whose
relations with beat policemen were already strained by accusations of unlicensed
trading, the agricultural department and the police had a hidden agenda: to drive
them out of business and out of Malindi. These were the arguments rehearsed dur-
ing an angry confrontation in a produce inspector’s office as sellers began gathering
on the morning of the 7th. Punches were thrown and distinctive curved Arabian
 daggers appeared from beneath traders’ robes. The scuffling spilled outside where
the ADI’s fatal stabbing took place. His assailants then made their way to the nearby
police station at Darajani, which also came under attack. It was here that the police
inspector died, mobbed by furious traders and knifed. Only then did the remaining
policemen fire into the crowd, killing four. An exemplary police riposte, no warning
shots, and instant dispersal of the crowd: the subsequent inquiry report praised
Zanzibar’s police for learning the lessons of efficient riot control by selective use of
lethal force94. The fact remained that two colonial officials had lost their lives trying
to pacify demonstrators. Why ? Because of a specific economic grievance against
the administration and the police.
It was a long way from communism to copra. Shanghai, 1925; Singapore, 1927;
Cyprus, 1931; and Zanzibar, 1936: each incident had specific local catalysts and
distinct patterns of escalation. But their obvious common feature was the targeting
of policemen by protesters95. Faced with such diverse threats, colonial police forces
found some unlikely champions in imperial government. One such occasion was in
early December 1935, at the height of Italy’s war in Ethiopia, when the newly
appointed Colonial Secretary, Jimmy Thomas, pleaded on behalf of Britain’s colo-
nial policemen to his Cabinet colleagues. Once a leader of the National Union of
Railwaymen, Thomas was, at first glance, no friend of police interests, but, by 1935,
as a National Labourite and former Dominions Secretary, he was a strong proponent
of Britain’s imperial connections. Colonial police forces, he insisted, needed sup-
plies of tear gas. Taking his cue from the Palestine High Commission, which, two
years earlier, successfully persuaded Ramsay MacDonald’s government to allow the
use of tear gas to disperse illegal assemblies, Thomas pointed to other colonies
where tear gas canisters rapidly deployed might have saved lives96. He cited civil
disturbances in Ceylon, Northern Rhodesia and, above all, Jamaica, as instances in
which colonial police were compelled to fire on rioters for want of any other means
to scatter a crowd. Tear gas was, he assured them, successfully used in Palestine to
deal with ‘banditry’ (quite how was left to ministers’ imagination) and to make
arrests when individuals were hiding in buildings. Since November 1934, moreover,
French gendarmes had been authorized to use tear gas as well as converted fire
engines that sprayed high-pressure water jets to break up demonstrations in France
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and North Africa. Tear gas, in short, offered a humanitarian alternative to police-
men’s bullets and Britain’s colonial police needed to keep up with the times97.
Thomas’s concerns brought other problems to light. For one thing, it was clear
that Cabinet had little sense of the frequency with which colonial police forces
resorted to lethal violence during riots, strikes, and prison disturbances. For another,
while tear gas might lessen the requirement to fire live rounds at protesters, there
was no question of curbing the powers of colonial police forces to use rifle fire when
necessary. The ministerial discussion also threw into sharper relief something of
which only Whitehall officials and colonial administrators were previously aware:
the question of how colonial police should respond to public disorder. The issue had
recurred time and again in the inter-war years and was the main Colonial Office con-
cern in relation to police affairs after World War I. The beginning of a Palestinian
general strike in April 1936, followed by the outbreak of rebellion over the summer,
would add urgency to familiar arguments about police militarization, the reliability
of locally-raised cadres, insufficient police intelligence, and the imposition of
 martial law98. The availability of tear gas, already used by British security forces in
Palestine, but uncommon elsewhere, pointed to the exceptional difficulties of polic-
ing the Mandate99. The departure from ‘minimum force’ solutions that resulted was
evident in the scale of political violence, the extent of reprisal killings, and the high
levels of security force brutality100.
CONCLUSION
The life of a colonial policeman did not fit a neat job description with roles and
responsibilities neatly demarcated. Colonial policing may be hard to pigeon-hole,
but official pre-occupation with protest policing and the practical problems and
legal difficulties it presented is more easily identified as a long-standing pre-occu-
pation. How to respond to public disorder and, more basically still, how to define it
provoked anxious discussion from the Whitehall corridors of the Colonial Office to
the backrooms of colonial government and outlying police stations. The British
experience suggests that these fundamental questions were, at best only partially
resolved in the twenty years after Walter Long first aired them with his colonial sub-
ordinates at the end of the First World War. Why was this so? So wide-ranging were
the definitions of public disorder embedded in colonial legislation that individual
police forces inevitably confronted a herculean task. They were expected to react
vigorously to gatherings that, in a non-colonial context, would not have been judged
a menace to social peace. Yet, enforcing stability through repression of protest was
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self-defeating because the stability in question was purchased in the short term
through actions sure to antagonize the indigenous majority in the longer term. At its
root, protest policing was a matter of resisting change, suppressing opposition, and
enforcing labour discipline. It was cyclical, with demonstrations and their suppres-
sion bound to repeat themselves so long as the politics that first brought people onto
the streets remained unaddressed. Until that point was reached policemen were, in a
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